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Abstract. Current information protection systems only detect and warn against
individual intrusion, and are not able to provide a collective and synthesized alert
message. In this paper, we propose a new Meta-IDS system which is called “SIA
System”. The SIA system can filter redundant alert messages, analyze mixed at-
tacks using correlation alert messages from each sensor and respond to security
threats quickly, after classifying them into one of four different statuses. Then we
implement the SIA system and test the efficiency of it in the managed networks.
Thus we confirm that the SIA system enables security managers to deal with secu-
rity threats efficiently.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Security systems such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System) and Firewalls have been
developed to detect and protect these systems in both wired and wireless networks.
However, along with the changes that have occurred in the patterns of attack and
the increasing use of variant methods, more and more attacks are now using diverse
and mixed techniques rather than being limited to a single attack technique or
making use of multiple exploits [4]. Unfortunately, current information protection
systems only detect and warn against individual intrusion, and are not able to
provide a collective and synthesized alert message.
Therefore, it is very difficult to detect and react effectively against variant ex-
ploits. It not only takes a lot of time to analyze and determine practical vulnerabili-
ties from the huge amounts of collected data in order to detect potential information
and protect the system, but also requires a lot of manpower, skilled in such security
issues.
Various methods have been used in order to solve these problems. References [2]
and [11] proposed the translation of security information from IDS log to Hybrid
format. Papers [11] and [10] were concerned with reducing false alerts by correlating
intrusion alerts and limiting the scope of redundant alert data. Studies [10] and [1]
proposed a methodology for identifying complex attacks using the data warehousing
and data mining methods.
In this paper, we propose a method of correlating the alerts provided by IDS
systems and Firewalls, and demonstrate the contribution of this method to the de-
tection of DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attacks, and test and implement
a new algorithm and security model which can be used to tackle security problems
quickly through the support of background data. Our approach facilitates the cre-
ation of the information necessary to evaluate the degree of danger, together with
the attack status of the managed network environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains related
works of the SIA (Security Information Alert) system, and current security system
status levels. Section 3 explains the evaluation criterion used in the SIA system.
Section 4 shows the implementation of the proposed model, along with the experi-
mental results. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
There are several approaches which have been taken in order to extract useful in-
formation from alerts or events gathered from Multisensor (Firewall, IDS, Network
Scanner, Syslog, etc.) [6, 8, 9, 12, 13]. These methods originated from the re-
quirement to integrate and analyze the data from the various established security
solutions, and have evolved so as to interface with systems that offer a higher de-
gree of security, as the information systems themselves have grown. The format in
which alerts and events are stored varies from one vendors’ product to another, and
this inconsistency in the event format poses a problem when it comes to analyzing
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log data synthetically and may confuse the information security manager, with the
result that it is difficult for him or her to recognize an attack.
To solve this problem, several different approaches have been used in an attempt
to obtain a uniform result from the sensors’ alerts and events. Meta-IDS [7] is a ma-
nagement system that can track alert data flowing from a Host-IDS to a Network-
IDS. There have been two approaches to constructing Meta-IDS systems. In the first
approach, the log data is converted to a standard format just before it is displayed on
the console. In the second approach, the security alerts are translated into a format
which is suitable for storing the data from each vendor’s product. The current ESM
(Meta-IDS) model supports message integration by means of an agent. However, it
is difficult to integrate different vendors’ agent alert data.
To solve this problem, for which there is no uniform guideline, the Intrusion
Detection Exchange Format working group (IDWG) of the IETF (Internet Engi-
neering Task Force) is currently working on standards that will enable different
IDS systems to communicate with each other, as well as with security consoles.
However, due to the lack of interest on the part of the security system companies
about IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) [5, 3], IAP (Intru-
sion Alert Protocol), CIDF (Common Intrusion Detection Framework) and IDXP
(Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol) in developing a standard format, and their
reluctance to abandon their own event representation, the current ESM (Enterprise
Security Management) or SIM (Security Information Management) system provides
just simple event format translation.
3 SIA SYSTEM
3.1 Overview
In the ESM systems, there are two approaches to unify the log data for an evalua-
tion of a security threat. One approach involves converting the log data from each
security product into a standard format, while the other involves translating the log
data from one security product’s format to another’s. The ESM can extract the
essential information from the bulk log data using a standard format. There are
several advantages to the SIA System’s logic, including the possibility of combin-
ing the logs from various security systems, integrating the messages from IDS and
Firewalls, and analyzing a large amount of raw data.
However, the particular benefit of the SIA system is that it can reduce the num-
ber of false alarms that occur in large distributed networks and systems, recognize
the security threats more easily, and facilitate the establishment of a contingency
plan to deal with these threats.
The SIA System can notify the system administrator of security threats to in-
formation systems, by applying problem finding logic after storing the information
obtained from the different security products in a common database. This applica-
tion of such logic is useful for identifying the overall threat, but not for individual,
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specific threats. It is possible to determine the level of the security threat based on
the source IP and the destination IP.
3.2 Proposed Differentiated Intrusion Alert Model
The intention of an attack can be summarized as consisting of four different statuses.
The categories of the attack statuses are determined according to the method of
attack used against the managed network assets. The attack types can be divided
into four levels, namely 1:1, 1:N , N :1 and N :N . Because the current IDS and
ESM systems generally evaluate network intrusion traces in managed networks as
being individual attacks, it is very difficult to generalize security threats. Therefore,
classifying the attack types syntactically facilitates the identification of security
threats.
In order to accomplish this, it is first necessary to survey the attack status of
managed network assets and to analyze the detailed alert information. This means
that the existing IDS and ESM systems concentrate on detecting the individual
attacks, whereas the SIA system focuses on evaluating the overall security threats
including a mixed attack. The four attack statuses recognized by the SIA system
are as follows:
1. an attack by multiple attackers on one target host,
2. vulnerability scanning and an attack in a managed network,
3. an attack on a specific destination host in an information network, and
4. large scale scanning multiple hosts.
Most information security systems generate alerts and events in the case of a specific
attack, with the result that they can create false alarms and have difficulty handling
an individual alert message. For example, the Nimda worm includes mixed threats
with an attack pattern consisting of the Unicode attack and the CodeRed backdoor
attack. In general, security systems’ sensors (Multisensor) cannot easily detect these
types of attacks.
Therefore, this paper proposes a new intrusion detection model that can better
evaluate the overall attack flow, rather than being concentrated on one individual
attack, by sorting the security threats according to the four different statuses defined
above, based on the intruder IP and the destination IP.
Figure 1 shows the four different security threat statuses. The threshold value is
referred to as the value used to determine the threat status by using the intruder IP
and the destination IP. The status is determined according to this threshold value.
The threshold value can differ depending on the scope of the managed network
system. More precisely, each status is determined according to the intruder host
count and the destination host count in the distributed network environment. The
threshold value can be varied, by taking into consideration the managed network
status. For example, if the intruder host count is small and the destination host
count is large, the potential security threats are the network subnet scanning, the
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Fig. 1. New analysis method of SIA
full scanning of a single host or a DDoS attack from multiple hosts on a few target
hosts. The basis for evaluating the attack as being Status A, B, C or D is not just
dependant on the alert messages from the sensor, but is also dependent on whether
the attack is on the target resource or is a general threat to the network system.
Furthermore, the information concerning the intruder IP address and destination IP
address is used to discriminate the security threat in a managed network. The status
values for security threats in a managed network can be summarized as follows;
Status A: N :1 attack type (many hosts attack a single host)
Status B: 1:N attack type (a single host attacks many hosts)
Status C: 1:1 attack type (a single host attacks a single host)
Status D: N :N attack type (many hosts attack many hosts).
The advantages of the use of these four statuses are as follows;
• the ability to evaluate the security threat from a large amount of data obtained
from multisensor
• the ability to detect a security threat based on data from multisensor in a ma-
naged network
• the ability to identify a security threat in a managed network
• a reduction in the number of false alarms and the creation of valuable data.
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4 IMPLEMENTATION
Fig. 2. Network roadmap
The SIA System architecture consists of a manager and a converter. Among the
multiple sensors, we implemented the interface with IDS, focusing on the ISS ICE-
CAP (BlackIce Manager) 2.6 and 3.0, SNORT 1.7 and 1.8, and that with the Firewall
focused on the PIX. We installed two servers which have Pentium III 800MHz pro-
cessors and 256MB of RAM as the converter servers, and a second server with Zeon
dual processors and 512MB RAM as the manager server. For the implementation of
the DB server, we used MS SQL 2000, the C programming language, Visual C++ 6
and Visual Basic 6. In the Firewall converter design, we limited our support to
the Syslog in the current implementation. The Firewall converter can change the
Syslog raw message saved in the DB into standard format. The IDS converter has
a separate DB for the data from each vendor’s product. It reads the raw messages
saved in the DB, and then saves this data in standard format in a high level DB.
Figure 2 shows network roadmap in the SIA system.
4.1 Experimental Results
We collected the test data of the SIA system in an ISP (Internet Service Provider)
infra-network. In our experiment, we researched the relationship between the in-
terval time and threshold value. We were mainly interested in comparing our SIA
system with IDS systems. Before explaining our experimental results, two termi-
nologies need to be defined, as follows.
Interval time: the time from the first raw alert occurrence to the last raw alert
occurrence. It is used for evaluating the attack status.
Threshold value: This provides the basis for the ‘N ’ value, as referred to in the
1:N , N :1 and N :N statuses.
The interval time can be set to a different value, depending on the network envi-
ronment. However, in our test cases, we set it to 3 minutes, because it takes at least
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3 minutes to integrate and generalize alert messages concerning the Nimda, Codered
and Welchia viruses more effectively than that which is possible with existing IDS
systems. If the interval time is set to less than 3 minutes, then the SIA system’s
experimental results are not different from those of general IDS systems. Likewise,
changing of the threshold value may give rise to different results. If the threshold
value is set to 1 or 2, the experimental results are not different from those of existing
IDS systems. In other words, if the threshold value is less than 2, it is possible to
distinguish 1:1, 1:N , N :1 and N :N attack statuses. In our test results, we confirmed
that minimum setting of 3 was required for the threshold value, in order to be able
to classify the attack status correctly. The relationships between interval time and
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Fig. 4. Status B – evaluation chart
Figure 3 shows the frequency of occurrence of status A according to the threshold
value and interval time. We can determine the variation in the status A occurrence
rate, when an attack with N :1 status happens. The greater the increase in the
threshold value, the smaller the reduction in the frequency of occurrence of status A.
In other words, in the case of an attack with N :1 status, as the threshold value rises,
the possibility of detecting DDoS type attacks grows smaller. In addition, we find
that the frequency of occurrence of status A gradually increases as the interval time
increases.
Figure 4 shows the frequency of occurrence of status B as a function of the
threshold value and interval time. It shows the rate of occurrence of alert messages,
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Fig. 6. Status D – evaluation chart
when an 1:N attack happens. Status B is detected, because either a single or several
intruders scan and attack many target hosts. We find that as the threshold value
increases, the frequency of occurrence of 1:N status is diminished. Also, if the
interval time increases, the frequency of occurrence of status B also increases. This
means that the number of attacks by a single attacker increases. In the experimental
results, we confirm that mainly worm attacks, such as those by Nimda and Codered,
are identified as Status B attacks.
Figure 5 shows the frequency of occurrence of status C as a function of the
threshold value and interval time. It shows the rate of occurrence of alert messages,
when a 1:1 attack happens. In Figure 5, we can observe that as the threshold value
increases, the frequency of occurrence of status C is not changed. However, as the
interval time increases, the frequency of occurrence of status C decreases linearly.
In other words, if the interval time is increased, then the number of 1:1 type attacks
detected grows smaller. Therefore, as the monitoring time increases, the number of
1:N , N :1 and N :N type attacks increases.
Figure 6 shows the frequency of occurrence of status D as a function of the
threshold value and interval time. It shows the rate of occurrence of alert messages,
when an N :N type attack happens. In Figure 6 we can observe that the number
of status D attacks decreases continuously as the threshold value increases. This
means that the basis ‘N ’ expansion of status D leads to a decrease in the frequency
of occurrence of N :N attack status. After having set the threshold value to the
minimum value of ‘3’, we attempt to increase the interval time value, and we find
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that the frequency of occurrence of status D grows incrementally. The threshold
count and interval time have an effect on the incidence of the different statuses.
Fig. 7. Status frequency rate according to threshold value
Fig. 8. Status frequency rate according to interval time
Figure 7 shows the frequency of occurrence of all 4 statuses as a function of the
threshold value, while Figure 8 shows the frequency of occurrence of all 4 statuses
as a function of the interval time.
The threshold count and interval time have an effect on the incidence of the
different statuses. In addition, these parameters can be adjusted according to the
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tool’s setup environment The change of status count by the reason of status occur-
rence can be altered according to methods of attack pattern and worm attack. The
threshold count and interval time have an effect on the incidence of the different
statuses. In addition, these parameters are adjusted according to the tool’s setup
environment. The status count can be adjusted by varying the threshold value and
interval time, in order to focus searching for a particular attack pattern.
The condition of the key factors:
• threshold value = from 3 to 12
• time interval = from 3 to 8 minute
Fig. 9. Status alert count for 10 days
Figure 9 shows the alert counts of the four statuses in the SIA system. In
Figure 9, the x axis represents the experimental date (10 days) and the y axis shows
alert counts that occurred in the SIA system. The status C means that a 1:1 attack
type mainly occurs in our experimental network.
Figure 10 shows the comparison data of the alert counts between the new SIA
system and the existing IDS system. In Figure 10, the x axis refers to the experi-
mental date (10 days) and the y axis shows alert counts detected in the SIA and IDS
systems. The figure shows that the alert counts are greatly decreased in the SIA
system compared with the IDS system. This result shows that the SIA system can
reduce the large amount of redundant alert messages generally occurred by mixed
attacks, e.g. the Nimda, IRCBot, Phatbot, Niche and Agobot worms, by classifying
them into one of four attack statuses. For example, the Agobot worm includes the
mixed attack patterns of an exploit attack, SYN flood, UDP flood and ICP flood.
Each sensor in IDS system recognizes the individual alert messages even if they are
generated by the same worm.
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Fig. 10. SIA alert and IDS alert
5 CONCLUSION
The current ESM system is vulnerable to fusion attacks and it is difficult to evaluate
the overall security threat to a managed network. Existing IDS systems generate
alert messages only for the 1:1 attack status. Also, with these systems, identifying
threat factors is very time consuming, even for security experts.
In this paper, we proposed a method of translating the various types of log
format into a standard format. Our proposed system then finds and assesses the
factors associated with a security threat in a managed network, using parameters
associated with the number of intruders and specific target hosts. In addition, we
eliminate the large amount of redundant alert messages, in order to reduce the
dependency on the human resources required to analyze them. Furthermore, we
implement a new Meta-IDS system, by taking into consideration the threat to the
entire managed network, rather than individual threat alerts. After testing the
SIA system, we confirmed that our system implementation could correctly analyze
and evaluate various types of intrusion, and that it was able to distinguish security
threats and attack statuses in managed networks.
To improve the performance of the SIA system, further research will be the
establishment of a more detailed subdivision of the threat factors associated with
a managed network.
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